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More than 70 years after the seminal paper of Coase (1937), we now count with several theories
that yield predictions regarding the determinants of the boundaries of the ￿rm. Transaction
Cost Economics (TCE hereafter) theories (Williamsom (1975,1985); Klein, Crawford and Alchian
(1978)) emphasize the role of ex-post quasirents as main determinant while Property Rights (PRT
hereafter) theories (Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990)) focus on the importance
of ex-ante investment incentives. On the empirical side, Lafontaine and Slade (2007) have shown
that even though the number of papers studying patterns of vertical integration is growing, our
knowledge of why and how ￿rms decide between vertical integration and outsourcing is still scarce.
As a matter of fact, Whinston (2003) shows that most theories are still left untested and that for
example PRT theories testable implications are indeed di¢ cult to test (see Baker and Hubbard
(2003) or Woodru⁄ (2002) for two exceptions). In this paper, I turn my attention to the impact
of product market competition on vertical integration. Product market competition is yet another
determinant of the boundaries of the ￿rm for which the theoretical literature has not o⁄ered clear
and consistent predictions and therefore one for which we must look at empirical evidence to obtain
answers.
As mentioned above, TCE emphasizes the role of quasirents in the make-or-buy decisions of
￿rms. Stronger market competition may increase the value of speci￿c investments elsewhere and
therefore may increase or decrease the likelihood of vertical integration depending on whether
the manufacturer relies completely on the input supplier making the speci￿c investment. In
the extreme case that the manufacturer is using a handful of suppliers, vertical integration will
decrease with product market competition. If a manufacturer depends completely on a single
supplier, stronger market competition will increase the likelihood of vertical integration. The PRT
approach also o⁄er predictions, but these go in all directions. On the one hand, De Bettignies
2(2006) shows in a Hotelling model that stronger competition will lead to less vertical integration
between manufacturers and retailers. On the other hand, Aghion, Gri¢ th and Howitt (2006) show
that there exists a U-shaped relationship between vertical integration and competition. Finally,
Grossman and Helpman (2002) ￿nd that stronger competition may lower the incidence of vertical
integration as long as the cost advantage of independent producers in their model is relatively
large and ￿nal producer￿ s bargaining power relatively small. In this paper, I empirically examine
the relation between product market competition and vertical integration in the Spanish local TV
industry and therefore validate or reject some of the predictions of these theories in that particular
setting.
In order to do so, I use the census of Spanish local TV stations for the years 1996, 1999 and
2002. The census also provides individual station characteristics for a number of TV stations that
vary across years. The census lists a total of 881, 740 and 898 stations for 1996, 1999 and 2002
respectively. Out of this, only 162, 425 and 600 stations (for each year respectively) report detailed
station-level information on number of hours and days on-air, percentage of content produced in-
house, the station geographical coverage, as well as the station a¢ liation to a network. On average,
TV stations in the data produce 70% of their content, are located in municipalities with 2.5 local
TV stations total, and face over 5 competing local TV stations in their coverage area. I argue that
changes in local market structure and station coverage area were induced by changes in regulation
in the Spanish media and telecommunication industry. Therefore, observed changes in outsourcing
associated with changes in product market competition are likely to be independent to market and
station characteristics. Even though this assumption allows me to claim exogeneity of my estimate
of the correlation between market competition and vertical integration, I present my results as
empirical correlations and associations between the two variables of interest.
My ￿ndings suggest that Spanish local TV stations facing stronger market competition are also
3less likely to vertically integrate in the production of their content and therefore they rely more
in program outsourcing. This result can only be found within years and provinces, but it fails to
show when examining markets across years or following stations across years. This suggests that
make-or-buy decisions are rather uniform across stations within markets and that these decisions
are di¢ cult to change once changes in market structure occur, at least in the short and medium
term. The instrumental variables analysis and evidence using ￿rst-di⁄erences provides supports
the hypothesis that the empirical relation between vertical integration and competition is mostly
in levels and not changes.
Other ￿ndings in the paper speak about the relation between vertical integration and a number
of other variables such as network membership, private ownership (as opposed to government
ownership), economies of scale, whether the station broadcasts its content (versus pay-per-view
mode), and whether the station advertises products for others. Results here show that stations
that are more likely to integrate the production of their content are also more likely to be located in
bigger cities with higher unemployment rates, they are more likely to o⁄er fewer hours of content,
they are more likely to broadcast their content, and they are more likely to be owned by local
government and authorities. Surprisingly, whether the station is a member of local TV station
network or other type of associations had no e⁄ect on their make-or-buy decisions of content
production.
An interesting set of results emerges when I investigate further the di⁄erential behavior of pri-
vately owned and government owned stations. It turns out that even though overall stations facing
a larger number of stations in their coverage area and private stations are less likely to integrate
the production of their content, private stations are more likely to integrate their content produc-
tion the higher the number of stations in their coverage area. This goes against most predictions
from established theories in that backward integration and competition are positively correlated
4when investigating decisions from pro￿t maximizing ￿rms. This result is easily reconcilible with
the industry institutions in this setting since stations may choose to produce a higher percentage
of their content when facing more competition to di⁄erentiate themselves from their competitors,
soften competition and therefore maximize pro￿ts.
The contribution of this paper is to test predictions of established theories on the relation
between vertical integration and competition. For this purpose, the paper reviews the relevant
theoretical and empirical literature. The main result in the paper that there is a negative em-
pirical relation between vertical integration and competition is in line with most predictions from
transaction cost economics and property rights theories of vertical integration. The result that
private stations are more likely to integrate the production of content as they face more competing
stations in their coverage areas seems to be at odds with most existing theories, but shows that in
this industry product di⁄erentiation occurs through content di⁄erentiation and therefore stations
are reacting to tougher competition by di⁄erentiating themselves when increasing the percentage of
content produced in-house. This is yet another role for vertical integration that has been ignored
by the existing literature. This role is especially interesting when considering media and creative
industries because innovative activities are di¢ cult to manage and contract upon. The gains from
softening competition through in-house innovation have been ignored in the literature up to now
(see Aghion and Tirole (1994) or Gil and Spiller (2007)), and therefore future theoretical research
should include it in the make-or-buy trade-o⁄ that ￿rms face in innovative industries.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the existing theoretical and empirical
literature that studies the relation between vertical integration and competition, as well as places
this paper￿ s contribution within the literature. In section 3 I describe the institutional details of
the Spanish local TV industry. Section 4 presents the data. In section 5 I describe the empirical
methodology that I use in the paper, show the results, and ￿nally, o⁄er a discussion of the results.
5Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
This paper contributes to an old literature that focuses on the determinants of incentive provision.
Among other things, many have studied the role of market competition on incentive provision
holding organizational form and the level of supervision constant. An example of this is Raith
(2003) on the relation between competition, risk and managerial incentives. He primarily examines
the relation between risk and incentive provision and shows that ￿rms in more competitive markets
provide stronger incentives and this increases ￿rm pro￿ts volatility.
Another related literature emphasizes the role of organizational form on incentive provision. For
example, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991 and 1994) show how asset ownership may help balance
incentives across non-contractible e⁄orts. These papers and others implicitly assume that market
based incentives may not work and, in particular to our interest in this paper, product market
competition may not provide strong enough incentives to economic agents. If that is true, the ￿rm
may serve as useful substitute to do so through costly monitoring.
Other papers directly address the role of product market competition in determining ￿rm bound-
aries. Grossman and Helpman (2002) develop a model of industry where organizational form is
endogenously determined in equilibrium. They study the impact of product market competition on
organizational form by conducting comparative statics on the elasticity of substitution of demand
for the ￿nal product. Their results indicate that stronger product market competition increases
outsourcing as long as independent producers are productive enough and the bargaining power
of ￿nal producers is relatively small. Another paper with mixed results is Aghion, Gri¢ th and
Howitt (2006). In their paper, they investigate the impact of competition on innovation and ￿nd
6that the relationship between competition and vertical integration is non-monotonic and takes a
U-shape form. Finally, de Bettignies (2006) builds a Hotelling linear city model that endogeneizes
integration between manufacturers and retailers located at the extremes. He shows that stronger
competition (lower transportation costs) are associated with less manufacturer-retailer integration.
Another part of this literature has also investigated the relationship between competition and
coordination of decisions within a ￿rm. These papers identify decision delegation with outsourcing
and centralization with integration. Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2008) show that in multi-
product ￿rms the ￿ atter the inverse demand curves of the di⁄erent products the higher the likelihood
of decision delegation to each one of product divisions. Legros and Newman (2008) examine the
centralization of decisions in a setting where coordination is necessary. Even though they assume
perfect competition, they ￿nd that an inverted-U relation between integration and prices exists.
Even more important, theirs is the only paper where di⁄erent organizational forms may coexist
in equilibrium. Others mentioned above cannot explain the wide variety of organizational forms
observed within a same industry. Finally, Ruzzier (2009) explores the relation between product
market competition and managerial autonomy. He ￿nds that, even though small increases in
competition increase the gains of managerial autonomy, too strong competition may lead managers
take excessive risks and therefore it may be optimal to withdraw autonomy from them. Therefore
again there is not a monotonic relation between market competition and decision delegation.
On the empirical side, Lafontaine and Slade (2007) review the empirical literature of the de-
terminants and consequences of vertical integration. In their review, there is no section directly
addressing the relationship between product market competition and ￿rm boundaries. This is be-
cause, to the best of my knowledge, there is little evidence and empirical research on this question.
In a recent exploratory study of Spanish manufacturing plants, Bayo, Gald￿n-SÆnchez and Gil
(2009) ￿nd a positive correlation between product market competition and outsourcing of services.
7Therefore the contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it tests the predictions of the existing
theoretical papers by empirically estimating the relationship between product market competition
and vertical integration. Second, it ￿lls the existing gap in the empirical literature of the determi-
nants of the boundaries of the ￿rm that so far has omitted the role of competition in make-or-buy
decisions.
3 Institutional Details
This section builds up from information obtained in personal interviews with industry managers.
Television stations are not di⁄erent than any other ￿rm in another industry in that they also
maximize pro￿ts. The di⁄erence strives in the product that they sell and their channels to ￿nance
the production of such product. Television stations rely in more than one revenue source and
this makes the problem at hand more interesting. On the one hand, television stations produce
content that they sell to television consumers. On the other hand, television stations sell television
space to advertisers. Since television consumers value television content free of advertising and
advertisers value the number of television viewers, stations need to balance revenues obtained from
both sources to maximize total amount of pro￿ts. Some stations may not charge consumers to
view their content and therefore maximize the number of viewers, and sell advertisement space to
advertisers at higher prices. Other stations choose to charge a subscription fee to consumers and
limit the amount of advertising.
In order to attract both viewers and advertisers, TV stations carefully choose the content of
their programming. Programs may be produced in-house or outsourced. In the case of outsourced
programming, these could be old content produced in the past and now recycled into current
programming, or content outsourced to an independent producer and speci￿cally produced for and
targetting that station￿ s audience. Alternatively, the content may be produced in-house by the
8programming division.
In this industry, whether to produce content in-house or buy elsewhere is important because it
di⁄erentiates the station product from others. Producing all the content internally may be very
costly but it sure di⁄erentiates a station￿ s product from other competitors. This strategy may be
also counter-productive if the station content ends up appealing to only a fraction of the population
and not the general public. Outsourcing content production will indeed be cheaper but it also
diminishes di⁄erentiation with other stations and increases the real degree of competition faced by
the station. Local station managers take into account these trade-o⁄s when making decisions and
therefore they base their content outsourcing decisions on the degree of expected competition.
Other factors that play an important role in this industry are whether the station is privately
owned (versus owned by local government), whether the station is integrated into a network, and
whether the station broadcasts. I talk more about these factors below as I explain di⁄erences
between the European and American model as well as the particular institutions governing the
Spanish local TV industry.
3.1 European versus American Model of Local Television
Television markets in Europe were traditionally organized very di⁄erently than US markets. The
US market is mainly characterized by its little government intervention and its verticality, whereas
the European markets are mainly characterized by strong government intervention and its lack of
verticality.
The US TV industry was ￿rst started and dominated by big stations in big markets. As smaller
stations started to arise in smaller markets, they became dependent of the dominant stations since
these were the main providers of content. Eventually, these relationships of content exchange were
so frequent that dominant stations and local stations formed what we know today as TV networks.
9Nowadays, local stations are ascribed to the networks and even though some of their content is
directly provided by the network, they still produce a share of their programming that re￿ ects the
idiosyncracies of the local demand that they serve such as local news and local documentaries.
The process described above is very di⁄erent than the process experienced by the European TV
industry. The European experience was mainly monitored by the government of each respective
country. Entry in this industry was highly regulated and the emergence of local stations was
limited. Most countries entered the 1980s with only government-owned stations and, in the best
of the cases, a few regional stations that broadcasted for a limited range of their national territory.
Given the dominant role played by national and regional stations, there was no room left for local
stations since regulation did not even acknowledge them as a legal entity. In other words, local
stations were alegal because they were not legal but they were not illegal either. This paper studies
the Spanish case and the consequences of changes in regulation towards local stations. I proceed
in this section using Spain as an example.
Spain counted with two TV stations until the mid 1980s, TVE and TVE2. The former was
the main station and the latter served as window to minority content and local news emitted from
small satellite stations that had little independence on their programming decisions. During the
mid 1980s and the consolidation of the new democratic regime, the central government granted
the right to its regional counterparts to develop regional stations. Still then, the local TV station
as entity was not recognized by the law, the central and regional governments. Despite this, a
number of local stations were created in the late 1980s as a result of the joint e⁄ort of local civil
associations. Since these local stations were neither prohibited nor recognized by the law, police
authorities often did not know what to do with their activities.
Many other local stations emerged in the following years and as their activities both economically
and culturally speaking grew in importance, the need for a legal framework that would regulate
10this new sector became clear to many politicians and regulators. As a result of this, the Spanish
government approved the law of local TV stations in 1996 through which it pretended to regulate
the composition, commercial activities, ownership and competitive structure of the local TV station
industry in Spain. Some of the most controversial points of the 1996 Law were that no more than
two local stations were allowed per city (regardless of city population), network formation was
prohibited and all local TV stations were to be non-pro￿t organizations and hold local government
personnel on their advisory and executive boards.
3.2 Liberalization of the Spanish Local TV Industry
The 1996 Spanish election changed the scenario quite a bit. The left-winged PSOE party lost
the election and the new party in power, the right-winged Partido Popular, had a very di⁄erent
perspective in how the Spanish local television industry should be regulated if at all. In short,
the Partido Popular believed that this industry needed to be deregulated and liberalized. For this
reason, they started a liberalization process that proved to be rockier than they ￿rst anticipated.
Due to the lack of support in congress, the initiative of the new government did not go forward.
As a consequence, the government chose to start a ￿silent￿liberalization. Badillo (2003) docu-
ments how the government chose not to enforce the law in place that was passed by the previous
government. In the 2000 election Partido Popular gained full control of the Parliament and decided
to push the deregulation that had been stopped during the previous legislature. The government
￿nally passed a new law in 2002 through which the 1996 law was modi￿ed and that started the
liberalization and deregulation of the Spanish local television industry. The new law did not regu-
late the local market structure per municipality nor the station ownership. In particular, stations
were no longer required to be government owned or run by local government o¢ cials. Similarly,
stations were allowed to be organizations run for pro￿t, and allowed to be part of networks with
11other local television stations and national and regional stations.
In this paper and the following sections in particular, I examine how changes in local product
market competition a⁄ected the percentage of content procuded in-house by local stations. This in-
deed was the main source of concern by politicians and regulators who feared that the liberalization
and privatization of this industry would ignore the idiosyncracies and needs of local municipalities
that were not being served by regional and national TV stations.
4 Data
To carry the research in this paper, I put together three yearly issues of the Spanish census of
local TV stations collected by the Asociacion de Investigacion de Medios de Comunicacion (AIMC
hereafter) for years 1996, 1999 and 2002. These census shows that there were 881 stations in 1996,
740 stations in 1999 and 898 in 2002. The census provides information on the location of all stations
in Spain during each one of the years. AIMC sent questionnaires to each of the existing stations
in each year and published the responses. Unfortunately only 183 stations in 1996 answered the
questionnaire while 457 and 645 responded in 1999 and 2002 respectively. In the questionnaire,
station managers responded questions regarding the station operation, coverage and reach area,
weekly and daily schedules, association memberships, advertising and broadcasting. The source of
the dependent variable in this paper is the item in the questionnaire that asks managers about the
percentage of content in their programming that is produced in-house. This variable is informative
of the extent of vertical integration and make-or-buy decisions in content production for each station
that responded to the questionnaire. Finally, I merged each of the cities in the data set with city
information contained in the business and population census published by ￿La Caixa￿every year
to account for di⁄erences across markets. This census does not provide information in towns that
have less than a 1,000 people and therefore I lose observations in the speci￿cations where I include
12city level controls.
Table 1 provides summary statistics across years and cities. Information in this table shows
that on average stations produce in-house 70% of their content. This table also shows that on
average stations compete with 5.5 stations in their coverage area but are located in cities with only
2.5 stations. They are on the air between 6 and 7 days and 102 hours a week. The average
station locates in a city with 150,000 inhabitants and 4% unemployment rate. Finally, 80% of
the stations responding to the questionnaire are privately owned, broadcast and emit paid-for
advertising. Stations in the sample associate with 0.75 station networks, and they barely ever
associate with cultural and other type of associations.
Given the change in regulation between 1996 and 2002, Table 2 breaks up the sample by year
and provides summary statistics for the same set of variables. The table shows that the percentage
of in-house content barely changed and was 0.69, 0.72 and 0.67 for 1996, 1999 and 2002 respectively.
The changes in competition were more abrupt and the number of stations in the coverage area of
respondent stations went from 5.5 to 4.7 and 6 respectively. These changes were mostly driven
by changes in the number of stations within the same city since these went from 2.6 to 2 and 2.8
respectively. The number of days that stations emitted stayed constant but the number of hours a
week went from 78 to 85 and ￿nally ended at 120 hours a week in 2002. The number of networks
went from 0.86 to 0.66 and then up to 0.76 in 2002. All the other variables in the table remain
stable across years.
Since changes in regulation between 1996 and 2002 had mostly an intended e⁄ect on the number
of local stations per city, Tables 3, 4 and 5 cross-tabulate the number of local stations per city for
all the stations listed in the census, including those that not responded the questionnaire. In Table
3, I cross-tabulate the number of local stations per city in 1996 and 1999. From this table, we can
see that the 881 stations were distributed among 579 cities. Similarly for 1999, the 740 stations
13were distributed among 553 cities. All cities located in the diagonal did not change the number of
stations between 1996 and 1999, while those in the upper triangle increased the number of stations
and those in the lower triangle saw the number of stations decrease. Overall 333 cities kept their
number of stations constant, 202 increased their number of stations and 290 decreased their number
of stations.
Tables 4 and 5 repeat the exercise in Table 3 but the former focuses in the transition between
1999 and 2002 while the latter focuses on years 1996 and 2002. Between 1999 and 2002, 516 cities
kept the number of local stations constant, 102 cities saw their number of stations go down and
therefore 207 saw the number of stations increase. Overall, between 1996 and 2002 Table 5 shows
that 273 cities over the whole period did not change the number of stations, 271 cities saw the
number increase and the number of stations decreased in 281 cities of the 825 cities present in the
full sample.
Finally, Table 6 cross-tabulates changes in the number of stations between 3-year periods 1996-
1999 and 1999-2002. This table shows that the number of local stations remained constant between
1996 and 2002 for 180 cities. The other 645 cities in the sample experienced changes in the number
of local stations in one (480 cities) or both 3-year periods (156 cities). As shown in this table,
there is enough variation in the data set to examine the question of whether vertical integration
decisions change with changes in competition. I proceed to the empirical analysis in the following
section.
5 Empirical Methodology and Results
This section describes the empirical methodology in this paper as well as the potential problems
that the analysis may encounter. After that, I show results of implementing this empirical strategy
14as well as variations from the main speci￿cations. Finally, I discuss the results and relate them to
the existing theoretical and empirical literature.
5.1 Empirical Methodology
The empirical analysis in this paper aims to recover the correlation between vertical integration
and competition in the Spanish local TV industry. For this purpose, my main speci￿cation used
in the paper will take the form of simple OLS regressions such that
V Iijt = ￿0 + ￿1Compijt + ￿2Xijt + ￿j + ￿t + uijt
where V Iijt is the percentage of content produced in-house by station i in city/market j and
year t, Compijt is a measure of competition that may vary at the station or city level, Xijt are
a number of controls and characteristics at the city and station level, and ￿j and ￿t are di⁄erent
geographic level and year ￿xed e⁄ects.
Since this research is mostly interested in recovering ￿1, I focus on two main possible problems
that could cause that corr(uijt;Compijt) 6= 0 and therefore that the parameter of interest is esti-
mated with a bias. The ￿rst possible problem is the endogeneity of in-house content production
and ￿rm entry. More pro￿table markets that accommodate a larger number of stations may also
have a higher taste for specialized content. On the other hand, it could be that larger markets
have a lower demand for specialized content since they need to appeal to a large variety of taste and
stations in larger markets are less likely to produce their content regardless of competition. The
second possible problem is omitted variable bias. There may be factors that are year or station
speci￿c that are unobservable to the econometrician, and correlated with Compijt.
I address both problems using the panel structure of the data set. I solve the ￿rst mentioned
15problem by using the three-year lagged market structure of each city as an instrument for the
market structure in the current year, that is, the market structure in 1999 as an instrument for
the structure in 2002 and so on. I create a measure of the market structure in 1993 (as an
instrument for Compij1996) using answers in the questionnaire to the item detailing in what year
the stations ￿rst started emitting. The assumption is that the number of stations in t ￿ 3 will
be correlated with the number of stations in t, and uncorrelated with the error term of the year
t, that is, corr(Compijt￿3;Compijt) 6= 0 and corr(Compijt￿3;uijt) = 0. The latter assumption
corr(Compijt￿3;uijt) = 0 is reasonable because of the iid assumption and the fact that the number
of stations in 1996 was completely unrelated to market characteristics due to the regulation existing
in 1996.
The latter potential problem is the bias in ￿1 due to the omission of variables unobserved by
the econometrician. This means that potentially the error term uijt could have a structure such
that
uijt = rij + zt + eijt
where rij are unobservable factors speci￿c to station i and city j, zt are unobservable factors speci￿c
to year t and eijt is a normally independently and identically distributed error term. Ignoring rij
and zt may not have consequences for the consistency of ￿1 as long as these are not correlated with
Compijt. In such case, the estimate of ￿1 will not be e¢ cient but still be consistent. The main
problem appears when rij and zt are correlated with Compijt. In that case, the estimates of ￿1
will be ine¢ cient and inconsistent. To address this issue, I use market and station ￿xed e⁄ects as
well as year ￿xed e⁄ects and control for all the unobservable factors that may bias the estimates
of the parameter ￿1.
16Finally, I also compute ￿rst di⁄erences for those stations that respond to the vertical integration
question in the survey in two consecutive years and run simple OLS such that
￿V Ii = ￿0 + ￿1￿Compi + ￿i
where ￿V Ii and ￿Compi are ￿rst-di⁄erences of vertical integration and competition at the station
level. I plot this last set of results in several graphs for expositional purposes. In the next section,
I proceed to implement the empirical strategy described here.
5.2 Results
In this section I explore the empirical speci￿cations detailed previously. First, I investigate in
the cross-sectional data the empirical correlation between my measure of vertical integration and
two metrics of competition at the station level. Second, I investigate how market and endogenous
station characteristics correlate with vertical integration and possibly crowd out the impact of
competition. Third, I investigate whether privately owned stations react di⁄erently to competition
than government-owned stations. Finally, I show the result of applying instrumental variables and
the ￿rst-di⁄erence analysis.
5.2.1 Vertical Integration and Competition
In Table 7, I regress the percentage of in-house content on two measures of competition. The
￿rst measure is the number of stations in the coverage area and it is determined at the station
level. The second measure is the number of stations located in the same city. The errors in all
speci￿cations are clustered at the city and year level since observations from stations in a same
market and year are likely to be correlated.
Columns (1) to (5) in Table 7 detail speci￿cations with the number of stations in each station￿ s
17coverage area. Columns (1) to (3) show a statistically signi￿cant negative correlation between
vertical integration and competition. This is robust to the inclusion of year and province ￿xed
e⁄ects. This means that stations with a larger number of stations in their coverage area are also
less likely to backward integrate the production of their content. This pattern is robust when
examined over time and within provinces. In columns (4) and (5) I introduce city and station
￿xed e⁄ects. The correlation is no longer statistically signi￿cant. When comparing this to results
in column (3), the result in column (4) indicates that stations within a same city tend to have
similar levels of vertical integration. Similarly, results in column (5) indicate that the degree of
vertical integration at a station does not seem to change when the number of competing stations
changes. This is evidence that make-or-buy decisions may be costly to change in the short and
medium term and therefore we should trust the cross-sectional evidence to be indicative of the
empirical relation between vertical integration and competition.
Columns (6) to (10) in Table 7 shows results of speci￿cations that include the number of stations
within each city as a measure of local product market competition. These speci￿cations in the
second-half of the table display all negative correlations with coe¢ cients of larger magnitudes than
those in columns (1) to (5). Unfortunately, none of these coe¢ cients are statistically signi￿cant.
When interpreting these results together with those in the ￿rst ￿ve columns in Table 7, I infer that
di⁄erences in vertical integration are not statistically signi￿cantly correlated with the number of
stations per city, but they are statistically signi￿cantly correlated with di⁄erences across cities in
the number of stations in the station￿ s coverage area.
5.2.2 Vertical Integration and Other Explanatory Variables
Tables 8 and 9 introduces market and station controls to speci￿cations in column (3) and (8) in
Table 7. This means that all speci￿cations include province and year ￿xed e⁄ects, and have errors
18clustered at the market and year level.
Table 8 controls for competition using the number of stations in the station coverage area.
Column (1) is the same speci￿cation as column (3) in Table 7. Column (2) controls for population
and unemployment rate and shows that the correlation between vertical integration and competition
is robust and that the two controls are not statistically signi￿cantly correlated with the percentage
of content produced in-house. Column (3) introduces controls that account for the total amount of
content by the number of days and hours a week that each station reports to be on the air. Results
in this column show that stations with more content are also less likely to vertically integrate and
that the statistical signi￿cance of competition is now gone. This result indicates that as stations
are in more competitive environments they tend to compete in the number of weekly hours and
that most of the adjustment occurs by outsourcing the production of content while keeping the
number of hours produced in-house constant.
Column (4) controls for whether the station emits advertising and whether the station broad-
casts its content. The results indicate that stations that advertise are less likely to integrate the
production of their content and that broadcasting stations are more likely to integrate the produc-
tion of their content. Column (5) controls for whether the station is privately owned and whether
the station is associated with a station network, cultural association or other type of association.
These controls are particularly meaningful because the change in regulation occurred between 1996
and 2002 allowed private investors to enter the industry and permitted the formation of local sta-
tion networks. Results show that privately owned stations are less likely to integrate production
of their content and that network and association membership are uncorrelated with make-or-buy
decisions in this setting. Finally, the speci￿cation in column (6) includes all controls used in Ta-
ble 8 and shows a number of robust results. First, stations located in cities with larger number
of inhabitants and higher unemployment rates are more likely to integrate their content produc-
19tion. Second, stations o⁄ering more weekly hours of content are less likely to integrate. Third,
broadcasting stations are more likely to integrate while privately owned stations are less likely to
integrate. After including all these controls, vertical integration is still negatively correlated with
competition but its coe¢ cient is no longer statistically signi￿cant.
Table 9 repeats the exercise in Table 8 but in this case I use the number of stations located in
each city as the measure of local competition. Results in column (6) are indeed very similar to
those in Table 8. In particular, stations located in cities with higher unemployment rate are more
likely to vertically integrate their content production, stations o⁄ering a large number of weekly
hours are less likely to integrate their production of content, broadcasting stations are more likely
to integrate their content, and privately owned stations are less likely to integrate. The direct
correlation between vertical integration and competition remain statistically insigni￿cant in the
same way that it was in the second half of Table 7.
5.2.3 Private vs Government-owned Stations
Results in Table 7 and 8 show that whether a station is privately owned is negatively correlated
with the percentage of content produced in-house. For this reason, I now investigate further how
privately owned (as opposed to government owned) stations change their make-or-buy decisions
when located in more competitive environments.
For this purpose, I provide results of new speci￿cations in Table 10. All the speci￿cations in
this table use the number of stations in each station￿ s coverage area and contain year ￿xed e⁄ects
and clustered errors at the city and year level. These speci￿cations do not contain any province
￿xed e⁄ects because they contain variables that vary at the province level and therefore ￿xed e⁄ects
would absorb their variation.
Column (1) is consistent with evidence in Table 8 and 9 in that privately owned ￿rms are
20less likely to integrate the production of their content while the coe¢ cient on competition goes
statistically insigni￿cant. The speci￿cation in column (2) interacts competition with the private
ownership dummy and shows that overall stations in more competitive markets are less likely to
integrate the production of their content, con￿rms that privately owned stations are less likely to
integrate but also that privately owned stations are more likely to integrate the higher the number
the stations they compete within their coverage area.
In speci￿cations (3), (4) and (5) I restrict the sample of stations to those for which all stations
within their city and year responded to the AIMC questionnaire. For these cities I compute the
average number of private stations per city and province per year. I introduce these new variables in
speci￿cations (3), (4) and (5) together with interactions with the number of stations in the coverage
area as well as whether the station is privately owned and three-way interactions. Results in these
three speci￿cations still show that there is a negative correlation between vertical integration and
competition, and that private stations are less likely to integrate their production of content. If
anything new, speci￿cation (5) shows that stations in provinces with a higher percentage of private
stations are less likely to integrate the production of their content.
Finally, in speci￿cations (6) to (8) I assume that all stations for which I do not have information
are government owned (not private) stations. This allows me to compute proxies for the percentage
of private stations in all cities and all provinces, and therefore I can run the same speci￿cations
in columns (3) to (5) with the full sample of stations for which vertical integration information
exists. These results con￿rm that stations with higher number of stations in their coverage area
and private stations are less likely to integrate content production, but private stations are more
likely to integrate content production the higher the number of stations in their coverage area.
215.2.4 Instrumental Variable Regressions
Up to now, all evidence (Tables 7, 8, 9 and 10) is showing results from OLS regressions. This
section investigates the results of using instrumental variables in the regressions of Table 7.1 As
explained above in the methodology section, I use the three-year lag of market structure in any
given city as an instrument for the current market structure of that same city.
Table 11 shows evidence of instrumenting for the number of stations in the station￿ s coverage
area (speci￿cations (1) to (4)) and the number of stations in each city (speci￿cations (5) to (8)).
The results show that there is no statistical relation between vertical integration and competition.
This result could be explained by two di⁄erent hypotheses. First, it could be that indeed there is
no relation between the two variables in this industry. Second, an alternative explanation is that
my instrument is not good and that the determinants of market structure (demand and supply
factors) in the past are the same across cities as in the current period.
5.2.5 First￿ Di⁄erences Analysis
Another possible source of bias may be the existence of ommitted variables that are correlated
with market structure in our analysis. For this purpose, I focus now on the analysis of those
stations that I observe in more than two periods consecutively in the data and drop all the other
observations. I am left with 97 stations for 1996 and 1999, and 270 observations for 1999 and 2002.
I compute ￿rst-di⁄erences2 and run simple OLS regressions of changes in vertical integration on
changes in the number of stations in the coverage area and changes in the number of stations in
each city.
See from results in Table 12 that changes in vertical integration and market structure between
1Table 11 does not instrument regressions with station ￿xed e⁄ects.
2See that this is very similar to including station ￿xed e⁄ects in the analysis in Table 7.
221999 and 2002 seem to be negatively correlated (speci￿cations (1) and (4)), but changes in vertical
integration and market structure between 1996 and 1999 (speci￿cations (2) and (5)) seem to be
positively correlated. When the two are combined, the overall correlation is positive if using
number of stations in coverage area as the measure of number of competitors, but negative if using
the number of stations per city as measure for market structure. Figures 1 to 6 plot each of the
points for each of the regressions in Table 12.
Finally, speci￿cations (7) to (9) in Table 12 regress changes in vertical integration with lagged
changes in the number of stations per city. As one can see in Figure 7, there is no variation
in the lagged change in vertical integration for speci￿cation (7). Figures 8 and 9 plot results
for speci￿cation (8) and (9). Overall, the results combining all data points is a negative and
statistically insigni￿cant relation between changes in vertical integration and lagged changes in
the number of stations per city. The overall evidence in the ￿rst-di⁄erence analysis seems to be
consistent with our instrumental variables section and shows that there does not seem to be a
relation between vertical integration and competition. If there is one, it could be the case that it
is di¢ cult to change make-or-buy decisions in the short and medium run.
5.3 Discussion of Results and Relation to Literature
Overall there a number of results in the previous section that deserve discussion. The main ￿nding
of the paper is that there exists a negative correlation between vertical integration of content
production and the number of competing stations in the coverage area. This result is consistent
with predictions from both transaction cost economics and property rights theories, and therefore
it is direct support for existing theories of vertical integration.
Another set of ￿ndings reports that private stations are less likely to vertically integrate than
government owned stations are but these are likely to increase the percentage of content produced in-
23house as the number of competing stations in the coverage area increases. This ￿nding establishes
a positive correlation between vertical integration and competition and therefore it is at odds with
predictions from existing theories of vertical integration. Grossman and Helpman (2002) show that
a positive relation may exist as long as the cost advantage of independent producers in their model
is relatively low and ￿nal producer￿ s bargaining power relatively large. Similarly, Aghion, Gri¢ th
and Howitt (2006) hypothesize that there exists a U-shaped relation between vertical integration
and competition such that at certain mid-range levels of competition an increase in competition
may increase the extent of vertical integration in innovative industries. Unfortunately, the quality
of the data does not allow me to test which of these theories, if any, may be more adequate to
rationalize this result.
An alternative way to rationalize this result is through the implicit connection in this industry
between make-or-buy decisions in content and product di⁄erentiation. How much content a station
produces in-house determines its di⁄erentiation with competing stations. Therefore, stations facing
a lot of competition may decide to increase the percentage of content produced in-house in order
to di⁄erentiate from others, soften competition and maximize pro￿ts. This result, and this study,
therefore sheds light on yet another role of vertical integration that has not received much attention
in the theoretical literature on the role and determinants of vertical integration.
Another interesting result is the negative relation between vertical integration and the total
number of weekly hours on the air. The larger the amount of hours in the air the lower the
percentage of content produced in-house. This result shows that there is a negative relation
between ￿￿rm size￿and vertical integration. Hortacsu and Syverson (2007) provide evidence for
manufacturing plants that show a positive relation between output and vertical integration. This
￿nding suggest that this relation is not universal and that it can go either way.
Finally, and to my surprise, I ￿nd no statistical relation between network membership and
24the degree of integration in content production. This comes as a surprise because one would
expect that one of the key advantages to belonging to a network is access to cheaper content and
sharing agreements. Moreover, part of the debate involved in the change in regulation in this
industry during the period under study revolved around whether local stations would be able to
form horizontal networks (with other local stations) or joint vertical networks (under regional and
national stations). Even though politicians were mostly worried about the loss of local identity of
stations, these concerns seemed to be unfounded according to the results in this research.
6 Conclusions
Existing theories of vertical integration provide divided predictions regarding the sign of the correla-
tion between vertical integration and competition. While transaction cost economics and property
rights theories predict a negative correlation between them, others such as Grossman and Helpman
(2002) and Aghion, Gri¢ th and Howitt (2006) show that the relation is not monotonic. This paper
takes this question to the data and tests for the empirical relation between vertical integration and
competition in the Spanish local TV industry.
The ￿ndings are mixed in that there is an overall negative relation between vertical integration
and competition in the data, but I also ￿nd that privately owned stations are likely to increase
the percentage of content produced in-house as the number of competing stations increase. While
the former result con￿rms predictions of dominant theories such as transaction cost economics and
derivations of the property rights theory, the latter result is at odds with this prediction and presents
a challenge to existing theories of vertical integration. I rationalize this result by understanding
the institutional details of this industry. As competition gets tougher, local stations choose to
produce a higher percentage of their content to di⁄erentiate themselves from other stations, soften
￿de facto￿competition and maximize pro￿ts.
25This result then sheds light on yet another role of vertical integration in markets where product
di⁄erentiation is important. On the one hand, vertical integration in innovative industries may be
too expensive since innovation is di¢ cult to manage and may have exploding costs when undertaken
in-house. On the other hand, integrating the production of content may di⁄erentiate the ￿rm￿ s
product from others and grant invaluable competitive advantage. The result in this paper provides
empirical evidence that local TV stations are sensitive to changes in this margin and therefore this
is an important trade-o⁄ for ￿rms and economic agents in media and innovative industries.
Unfortunately, there is not enough theoretical literature on the role of vertical integration as a
source of product di⁄erentiation and therefore the empirical evidence may lack depth in the analysis
of testable implications. Future theoretical research should explore this issue and provide testable
models with policy implications. On the empirical side, I believe that the relation between vertical
integration and competition is an empirical question that has received very little attention and it
is understudied. I can only hope that this study will foster future empirical research on this same
issue and related topics in this and other industries.
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28Table 1. Summary statistics across years and stations
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
% Content In-House 1187 0.69 0.30 01
Comp. Coverage Area  1285 5.54 7.71 16 9
Local Competition 1285 2.46 2.70 11 7
City Population 1269 150803.10 431929.50 1082 3016788
Unemployment Rate 1269 4.21 1.86 0.6 12.2
Weekly Hours 1133 102.22 62.07 1 168
Weekly Days 1189 6.57 1.17 07
Private Ownership? 1250 0.80 0.40 01
No. Networks? 1285 0.74 0.74 04
No. Cultural Assoc? 1285 0.04 0.20 02
No. Other Assoc? 1285 0.03 0.18 02
Advertising? 1255 0.81 0.39 01
Broadcasting? 1261 0.80 0.40 01
This table provides summary statistics for all variables used in this study.Table 2. Summary statistics by year
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Year 1996 Year 1999 Year 2002
% Content In-House 162 0.69 0.27 425 0.72 0.29 600 0.67 0.31
Comp. Coverage Area  183 5.48 6.41 457 4.67 6.68 645 6.17 8.62
Comp. Same City 183 2.62 3.02 457 1.98 2.10 645 2.76 2.92
City Population 179 180144.8 455363.1 453 131827 418793.30 637 156052.8 434449.3
Unemployment Rate 179 6.44 1.67 453 3.96 1.59 637 3.77 1.63
Weekly Hours 161 77.84 54.00 386 85.80 59.70 586 119.74 60.52
Weekly Days 159 6.72 1.06 385 6.50 1.21 645 6.58 1.16
Private Ownership? 172 0.80 0.40 450 0.79 0.41 628 0.80 0.40
No. Networks? 183 0.86 0.75 457 0.66 0.73 645 0.76 0.74
No. Cultural Assoc? 183 0.03 0.18 457 0.04 0.22 645 0.04 0.19
No. Other Assoc? 183 0.02 0.15 457 0.03 0.20 645 0.02 0.17
Advertising? 174 0.89 0.31 448 0.77 0.42 633 0.82 0.39
Broadcasting? 178 0.83 0.38 449 0.76 0.43 634 0.82 0.39




0 1 2 3 4 5 6 12 13 Total
0 86 149 10 1 0 0 0 0 0 246
1 176 213 30 4 1 0 0 0 0 424
2 8 5 9 2 423100 0 9 7
3 2 1 4 990000 0 3 4
4 02420100 0 9
5 02100000 0 3
6 00012010 0 4
7 00101000 0 2
8 00001000 0 1
9 00010001 0 2
13 00000010 0 1
15 00000000 1 1
17 00001000 0 1
Total 272 439 79 20 9 2 2 1 1 825




0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 11 13 16 Total
0 148 117 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 272
1 65 324 36 10 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 439
2 5 2 2 3 3 1 24200 0 1 0 007 9
3 10762300 0 0 1 002 0
4 00112221 0 0 0 00 9
5 00000100 1 0 0 00 2
6 00000020 0 0 0 00 2
12 00000000 0 0 0 10 1
13 00000000 0 0 0 01 1
Total 219 463 83 30 10 10 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 825




0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 11 13 16 Total
0 37 190 16 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 246
1 166 211 33 9 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 424
2 11 55 15 8 5 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 97
3 56 1 470200 0 0 0 003 4
4 01321000 1 0 1 00 9
5 00210000 0 0 0 00 3
6 00010021 0 0 0 00 4
7 00000010 0 1 0 00 2
8 00000100 0 0 0 00 1
9 00000100 0 0 0 10 2
13 00000010 0 0 0 00 1
15 00000000 0 0 0 01 1
17 00001000 0 0 0 00 1
Total 219 463 83 30 10 10 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 825
This table tabulates the number of local stations per city for the years 1996 and 2002. Each observation is a city.Table 6. Changes in Local Competition from 1996 to 1999 vs Changes in Local Competition from 1999 to 2002
Change in Local Competition 1999 to 2002
Change in Local 
Comp. 1996 to 1999 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 … +8 Total
-13 00010000 0 0 1
… 00000000 0 0 0
-7 00010000 0 0 1
-6 00000100 0 0 1
-5 00000000 0 1 1
-4 00003000 0 0 3
-3 00042100 0 0 7
-2 002 1 1 8521 0 0 2 9
-1 0 1 5 193 38 7 1 0 0 1 246
0 0 3 35 180 102 9 3 1 0 0 333
+1 0 0 48 117 14 1 2 0 0 0 182
+2 12571100 0 0 1 7
+3 00022000 0 0 4
Total 1 6 95 516 170 25 8 2 0 2 825
This table groups by city the changes occurred first between 1996 and 1999, and changes between 1999 and 2002.Table 7. OLS Regressions of Vertical Integration on Two Measures of Competition
Dep Variable: % Content Produced In-House
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Comp. Coverage Area  -0.0026 -0.0023 -0.0022 -0.0025 0.0025
(0.0010)** (0.0010)** (0.0011)** (0.0021) (0.0039)
Local Competition -0.0059 -0.0049 -0.0011 0.0078 -0.0061
(0.0041) (0.0043) (0.0041) (0.0086) (0.0123)
Constant 0.7071 0.7058 0.7012 0.7073 0.6790 0.7070 0.7046 0.6924 0.6770 0.7073
(0.0105)*** (0.0105)*** (0.0207)*** (0.0264)*** (0.0358)*** (0.0125)*** (0.0127)*** (0.0218)*** (0.0339)*** (0.0497)***
FE Year NYYYY NYYYY
FE Province NNYNN NNYNN
FE City NNNYN NNNYN
FE Station NNNNY NNNNY
Observations 1187 1187 1187 1187 1187 1187 1187 1187 1187 1187
R-squared 0 0.01 0.16 0.6 0.9 0 0.01 0.15 0.6 0.9
Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered by city and year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.Table 8. OLS regressions of vertical integration on competition and station characteristics
Dep Variable: % Content Produced In-House
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Comp. Coverage Area  -0.002205 -0.002868 0.0015324 -0.002428 -0.000964 -0.000772
(0.0011)** (0.0013)** (0.0012) (0.0011)** (0.0011) (0.0014)
City Population 0.00003 0.00005
(1000s) (0.00003) (0.00003)*
Unemployment Rate 0.0061015 0.0162033
(0.0076) (0.0080)**
Weekly Hours -0.0014 -0.001479
(0.0002)*** (0.0002)***










Cultural Assoc? -0.016336 -0.06311
(0.0470) (0.0520)
Other Assoc? -0.075643 -0.074112
(0.0499) (0.0573)
Constant 0.7012 0.6607 0.7986 0.6995 0.7857 0.6489
(0.0203)*** (0.0524)*** (0.0581)*** (0.0369)*** (0.0271)*** (0.0794)***
Observations 1187 1172 1064 1158 1167 1010
R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.2 0.17 0.18 0.23
All six specifications in this table contain year and province fixed effects.
Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered by city and year. * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%Table 9. OLS regressions of vertical integration on local competition and station characteristics
Dep Variable: % Content Produced In-House
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Local Competition -0.0011 -0.0025 0.0100 0.0003 0.0026 0.0095
(0.0041) (0.0070) (0.0045)** (0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0074)
City Population 0.00001 0.00001
(1000s) (0.00004) (0.00004)
Unemployment Rate 0.0037 0.0138
(0.0076) (0.0079)*
Weekly Hours -0.0015 -0.0015
(0.0002)*** (0.0002)***










Cultural Assoc? -0.0179 -0.0599
(0.0472) (0.0534)
Other Assoc? -0.0808 -0.0762
(0.0501) (0.0574)
Constant 0.6924 0.6690 0.7890 0.7038 0.7795 0.6555
(0.0218)*** (0.0524)*** (0.0589)*** (0.0368)*** (0.0282)*** (0.0777)***
Observations 1187 1172 1064 1158 1167 1010
R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.21 0.17 0.18 0.23
All six specifications in this table contain year and province fixed effects.
Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered by city and year. * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%Table 10. OLS regressions of vertical integration on local competition and ownership type of competing stations
Dep Variable: % Content Produced In-House
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Comp. Coverage Area  -0.0009 -0.0128 -0.0092 -0.0098 -0.0071 -0.0136 -0.0127 -0.0158
(CCA) (0.0010) (0.0040)*** (0.0037)** (0.0038)** (0.0207) (0.0041)*** (0.0042)*** (0.0074)**
Private Ownership? -0.1635 -0.1986 -0.1652 -0.1468 -0.1392 -0.2642 -0.2747 -0.2671
(PO) (0.0188)*** (0.0224)*** (0.0997)* (0.0980) (0.1001) (0.0514)*** (0.0539)*** (0.0559)***
CCA*PO 0.0125 0.0148 0.0171 0.0177 0.0128 0.0121 0.0169
(0.0041)*** (0.0137) (0.0154) (0.0267) (0.0053)** (0.0055)** (0.0082)**
% Private in City -0.0269 -0.0456 0.0052
(PO%) (0.1030) (0.1016) (0.1028)










Proxy % Private in City 0.0742 0.0846 0.1080
(PPO%) (0.0547) (0.0575) (0.0613)*










Constant 0.8269 0.8584 0.8571 0.8571 1.0043 0.8558 0.8569 0.9034









Observations 1167 1167 891 891 891 1167 1167 1167
R-squared 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.08
This table shows eight specifications that regress % of content produced in-house with competition in the coverage area and dummy for private
ownership of the station. Columns (2) to (8) include controls that accout for interaction effects and percentage of stations in the city and province
that are also privately owned (not government owned).
I run specifications under two samples. Columns (3) to (5) only use observations from cities for which I have full information on all stations in those cities.
Columns (1), (2), and (6) to (8) include all the sample. For the latter, I assume that if a station that does not provide information is government owned.
For this reason, I create proxy variables for percentage of privately owned stations in the city and the province.
Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered by province and year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.Table 11. IV regressions of vertical integration on competition
Dep Variable: % Content Produced In-House
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Comp. Coverage Area  0.00374 0.00392 0.00284 -0.1506
(0.0074) (0.0057) (0.0069) (1.2373)
Local Competition 0.00452 0.00504 0.00332 0.02071
(0.0085) (0.0069) (0.0077) (0.0278)
Constant 0.67158 0.66974 0.47548 0.92556 0.68149 0.67815 0.47265 0.11113
(0.0429)*** (0.0369)*** (0.0927)*** (0.6082) (0.02307)*** (0.0272)*** (0.0945)*** (0.0278)***
FE Year NYYN NYYN
FE Province NNYY NNYY
FE City NNNY NNNY
Observations 1187 1187 1187 1187 1187 1187 1187 1187
R-squared N/A N/A 0.14 N/A N/A N/A 0.15 0.6
This table shows results of applying ivreg command in STATA. See that the instrument (number of local stations in
the city three years before) varies per city and year and therefore I can apply city and province fixed effects.
The stata output did not provide R-squared statistic for 5 out of 8 specifications.
Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered by city and year.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
 *** significant at 1%Table 12. OLS regressions of changes in vertical integration on changes in competition
Dep Variable: Change in % Content Produced In-House
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Change Comp. 
Coverage Area  -0.0005 0.0045 0.0002
(0.0030) (0.0062) (0.0031)
Change Local 
Competition -0.0197 0.0040 -0.0120
(0.0171) (0.0093) (0.0092)
Lagged Change 
Local Competition - 0.0084 -0.0021
- (0.0112) (0.0096)
Constant -0.0256 0.0341 -0.0107 -0.0174 0.0353 -0.0083 -0.0262 0.0510 -0.0117
(0.0124)** (0.0316) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0332) (0.0121) (0.0118)** (0.0388) (0.0121)
Sample 99-02 96-99 All 99-02 96-99 All 99-02 96-99 All
Observations 270 97 367 270 97 367 270 97 367
R-squared <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.02 <0.01 0.01 <0.01 0.01 <0.01
This table shows OLS regression results of changes on changes
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Figure 1. Scatter plot changes in vertical integration on changes in competition in coverage area 
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Figure 2. Scatter plot changes in vertical integration on changes in competition in coverage area 
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Figure 3. Scatter plot changes in vertical integration on changes in competition in coverage area 
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Figure 4. Scatter plot changes in vertical integration on changes in local competition in coverage 









































-5 0 5 10
Change in Local Competition
Fitted values changevi
Changes Between 2002 and 1999 in Vertical Integration and Local Competition
  
Figure 5. Scatter plot changes in vertical integration on changes in local competition between 
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Figure 6. Scatter plot changes in vertical integration on changes in local competition in coverage 
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Figure 7. Scatter plot changes in vertical integration 2002-1999 on lagged changes in local 
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Figure 8. Scatter plot changes in vertical integration 1999-1996 on lagged changes in local 
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Figure 9. Scatter plot changes in vertical integration on lagged changes in local competition 
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